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Abstract
We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are 푁 types of
bidders whose valuations are drawn from different distribution functions. The seller cannot
determine the specific type of each bidder. First, we show that the number of bidders affects
the reserve price. Second, we give the sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal
reserve price. Third, we find that if a bidder is replaced by a stronger bidder, the optimal
reserve price may decrease. Finally, we give sufficient conditions that ensure the seller will
not use a reserve price; hence, the auction will be efficient.
JEL Codes: D44.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are widely used by business, government and citizens to buy and sell goods. For
example, firms use auctions for initial public offerings, governments use auctions to sell
spectrum licenses and the general public has been increasingly using auction sites such
as E-bay. In many of these auctions, single goods are sold and sellers use reserve prices.
Accordingly, there has been much research on the effect of reserve prices in single object
auctions (e.g., Maskin and Laffont (1980), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Englebrecht-Wiggans
(1987), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Levin and Smith (1996), McAfee and Vincent (1997),
Gershkov (2009), Lu (2010), Hu et. al. (2010)). However, all of these papers assume
symmetric bidders. In this paper, we relax this commonly-used assumption by allowing
the independent private valuations to be drawn from different distribution functions, then
analyze how this will affect optimal reserve prices.
In our model, there is one good that is auctioned off using a second price auction. The
seller knows that there are 푁 types of bidders whose valuations are drawn from different
distribution functions but he cannot determine the specific type of each bidder,1 or equiv-
alently we assume that the seller has to use a unique reserve price.2 We give conditions
that determine whether or not the seller will use a reserve price. If a reserve price is used,
we analyze its properties for cases where the bidders’ valuations are drawn from common
supports. Our assumptions differ from Myerson (1981) who studies the revenue maximizing
mechanism under the assumption that seller can determine the types.3 As a result, he finds
a “discriminatory reserve price”; i.e., an optimal reserve price for each type. Our motivation
comes from the fact that in practice, almost all auctions have a single reserve price (or no
reserve price at all).4 We show that the optimal reserve price is determined when bidders’
1This is an assumption commonly used in industrial organization. Firms are aware of the distribution
of types across consumers but they cannot price discriminate because they do not know which specific
consumers have each given type.
2For example, when government agencies cannot use different reserve price for different bidders; they may
be accused of corruption, if they do so.
3Myerson (1981) also shows that there exists a unique optimal reserve price when bidders are symmetric.
4Englmaier and Schmo¨ller (2012) document that many players do not use reserve price while playing the
online game HATTRICK.
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weighted average of virtual valuations is equal to the seller’s valuation. In Myerson (1981),
the optimal reserve price is found by equating the virtual valuation of each bidder to the
seller’s valuation; hence, there is a different reserve price for each type of bidder.5
Our first contribution is showing that, under these assumptions, the number of bidders
affects the optimal reserve price. This is in contrast with Maskin and Laffont (1980) and
Riley and Samuelson (1981). This result is in line with Levin and Smith (1996) but their
model assumes affiliated valuations. In a private valuation model, a reserve price affects
revenue when there is exactly one agent bidding above the reserve price. In the case of
symmetric bidders, the marginal cost and marginal revenue of changing the reserve price
will be the same regardless of the identity of this bidder since all bidders are identical. In
the case of asymmetric bidders, however, the identity of the bidders will have an effect.
Changing the number of agents of each type will influence the probability of who may be
that critical agent and, as a result, the reserve price will be affected.
Our second contribution is to show that if a weak bidder is replaced with a stronger bidder
(“strongness” is determined by the first order stochastic dominance), the optimal reserve
price may decrease. Hence, there is no monotonic relation between first order stochastic
dominance and the reserve price. Hu et. al. (2010) show that the optimal reserve price will
decrease if the seller becomes more risk averse since the seller does not like the risk of not
selling the object. In our model, the seller is risk-neutral but lowers the reserve price due to
a change in the type of bidders.
Our third contribution is giving sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal
reserve price. We prove this by showing that the revenue function is quasi-concave when
there are bidders that can be ranked via likelihood ratio dominance.
Our fourth contribution is showing when the seller will use (effective) reserve prices,
and when she will not.6 We show that when the virtual valuation of each bidder at the
5It must be clear by writing “bidders who have different types” we mean that their valuations are drawn
from different distribution functions. Of course, bidders who have the same type will have different valuations
with probability measure 1 since support is continuous.
6By effective reserve price, we mean a reserve price strictly greater than the lower bound of buyer’s
valuations.
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lower bound of the support is greater than the seller’s valuation and Myerson’s regularity
condition holds, then the seller will not use an effective reserve price. While there are other
papers in the literature that find the same result (e.g. Englebrecht-Wiggans (1987), McAfee
and McMillan (1987), and Lu (2010)), they all assume that symmetric bidders have to pay
some participation (or information) cost/fee before entering the auction or non quasi linear
utility functions (Dastidar (2010)). In our model, asymmetric bidders do not have cost of
participation nor do they buy information. We find sufficient conditions for cases when the
seller uses and does not use an (effective) reserve price. When the seller does not use reserve
price, the auction is efficient. The implicit assumption in the literature (e.g Myerson (1981))
is that the seller is committed not to re-auction the object if he fails to sell it in his first
attempt (McAfee and Vincent (1997) is one of the exceptions in the literature). By finding
the conditions that make using the reserve price redundant, we ensure that the commitment
problem is not an issue.
There are a few papers in the literature that assume asymmetric bidders other than
Myerson (1981). Plum (1992) and Lebrun (1999) show the existence of equilibrium bids.
Maskin and Riley (2000) and Kirkegaard (2010) compare revenues of the English (second
price) auction and the high-bid (first price) auction. Cantillon (2008) investigates the effect
of bidder asymmetries on revenue of different auction formats compared to a symmetric case
(geometric average of the asymmetric distributions). Kirkegaard (2005) shows that using
reserve price is better than using entry fees. None of these papers analyze the optimal reserve
price.
2 Asymmetric Distributions with Common Support
Assume that there are 푁 ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders, and one risk-neutral seller with one object.
Bidders’ valuations are independently distributed with cumulative distribution functions 퐹푖,
푖 = 1, 2, ..푁 with support [휈, 휈] (with 휈 ≥ 0). All distribution and density functions are
continuously differentiable and density function 푓푖 are positive everywhere.
7 The distribu-
7This implies continuous differentiability of the expected revenue function.
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tions are common knowledge but the valuations are private information. The seller cannot
determine the specific type for each bidder.8 We assume that we have at least one 푖 such
that 퐹푖 ∕= 퐹푗; hence, we have asymmetric bidders. The value of the object to the seller is
푥0 < 휈. If the inequality does not hold, the seller will never sell the object.
We will calculate the optimal reserve price that will be set by the seller in a second-price
auction. It is well-known that the bidders bid truthfully in a second price auction even when
they know the existence of asymmetric bidders (e.g. see Krishna (2009)). First, we have
to calculate the seller’s revenue function, 퐸Π, when facing asymmetric bidders. For this,
we will fix a bidder 푖, and calculate the first (i.e., highest) order statistic of the remaining
bidders; 퐻푖(푥) =
∏
푗 ∕=푖 퐹푗(푥). We let ℎ푖 denote the corresponding density function. The
expected revenue function is given by:
퐸Π = 푥0
푁∏
푖
퐹푖(푟) +
푁∑
푖
[(1− 퐹푖(푟))퐻푖(푟)푟 +
∫ 휈
푟
(
∫ 푥푖
푟
푦ℎ푖(푦)푑푦)푓푖(푥푖)푑푥푖]
The first term with 푥0 shows that the case where all bidders bid below the reserve price
푟. The first term in the brackets of summation shows the case where a given bidder 푖 wins
the auction and all other bidders bid below the reserve price 푟, or equivalently, the other
bidders do not enter the auction. The second term is the expected payment of bidder 푖 given
that he wins the auction, and at least one other bidder bids above 푟. Finally, to get the
expected revenue function, we have to sum over all 푁 bidders.
By changing the order of integration, we can write this as:
퐸Π = 푥0
푁∏
푖
퐹푖(푟) +
푁∑
푖
[(1− 퐹푖(푟))퐻푖(푟)푟 +
∫ 휈
푟
푦ℎ푖(푦)(1− 퐹푖(푦))푑푦]
By taking the derivative of this function with respect to 푟, we have the following equation:
8This is analogous to a firm facing two or more different types that it cannot distinguish. One can also
assume that the seller can distinguish the types but is required to use a unique reserve price by law. For
example, a government agency cannot treat bidders differently and use different reserve price for different
bidders.
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퐸Π′ = 푥0
푁∑
푖
푓푖(푟)퐻푖(푟) +
푁∑
푖
퐻푖(푟)(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)푟)
=
푁∑
푖
퐻푖(푟)(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) (1)
We use Myerson’s virtual valuation which is 퐽푖(푥) = 푥− 1−퐹푖(푥)푓푖(푥) in the equation, then we
have:
퐸Π′ = −[
푁∑
푖
퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)(퐽푖(푟)− 푥0)] (2)
So we find an equation that the optimal reserve price must satisfy. Our first lemma
summarizes this result.
Lemma 1 Any interior optimal reserve price must satisfy the implicit equation:
푁∑
푖
퐻푖(푟)(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) = −
( 푁∑
푖
퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)(퐽푖(푟)− 푥0)
)
= 0 (3)
The first order condition shows that bidders’ weighted average of virtual valuations is 푥0 at
the optimal reserve price, since one can re-write the first order condition as
∑푁
푖 퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)(퐽푖(푟)−푥0)∑푁
푖 퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)
=
0⇒
∑푁
푖 퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)(퐽푖(푟))∑푁
푖 퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)
= 푥0. In Myerson (1981), when bidders are asymmetric but their dis-
tributions are known, a different reserve price is determined for each bidder by setting their
virtual valuation equal to the seller’s valuation. This may result in an inefficient alloca-
tion since the bidder who values the object most may lose the auction.9 As we discussed
before, setting a different reserve price for different bidders is not practical. For example,
government agencies cannot set different reserve price for different bidders. If one uses a
unique reserve price, the inefficient allocation result of Myerson (1981) also disappears (at
the expense of seller’s revenue). That is, if the object is sold, the winner would be the bidder
who values it most in our second price “unique” reserve price auction.
9The inefficiency in Myerson’s paper can be, other than the reserve price, due to the allocation rule; one
with the highest virtual valuation gets the object. His mechanism favors the weak.
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If we had symmetric bidders (i.e, 퐹푖 = 퐹 , 퐻푖 = 퐻, and 퐽푖 = 퐽 for all 푖), equation 3
would be equal to (1 − 푓(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) = 퐹 (푟) or 퐽(푟) = 푥0, and hence, the optimal reserve
price would not depend on the number of bidders (Maskin and Laffont (1980), Riley and
Samuelson (1981), and Krishna (2009)). However, in our case, the optimal reserve price does
depend on the number of bidders.
Why does the result change? One has to understand that the reserve price matters when
there is exactly one bidder bidding above the reserve price. Suppose that with symmetric
bidders, we increase the reserve price slightly (by one very small unit). The marginal cost of
increasing 푟 is the net expected revenue forgone by not selling the object. In equation 3, this
is the part (푟−푥0)푓(푟)퐻(푟) where the seller loses 푟 with probability 푓(푟)퐻(푟) but still owns
the object so enjoys 푥0. The net marginal benefit of increasing 푟 is (1− 퐹 (푟))퐻(푟)(푟 − 푥0).
The winning bidder pays the new higher reserve price when she is the only person bidding
higher than 푟 and no other players bids above r. The probability of this is (1−퐹 (푟))(퐻(푟)).
Since the loser sells the object, he loses 푥0 so this amount is subtracted. With symmetric
bidders, it does not matter which bidder was bidding above the reserve price. The marginal
cost and benefit is the same for any given bidder.
Now consider our asymmetric case and for the sake of example assume there are two
(types of) bidders. Increasing the reserve price will give different marginal costs and benefits
since it now matters whether the bidder bidding above the reserve price is the first or the
second type. As the number of bidders changes, it affects the probability that the bidder
bidding above the reserve price is the first or second type, and the reserve price is affected.
However, note that if we double the number of all types of bidders, we find the same optimal
reserve price. On the other hand, if we add more of one type of bidder, the optimal reserve
price still changes.10
Example 2 Suppose there are 푁 bidders whose valuations are drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution 퐹 , and 푀 bidders whose valuations are drawn from the distribution function
10Assume that an E-bay seller faces bidders from two countries (i.e types). If she expects that bidders
from one country would increase, then she should set a reserve price accordingly.
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퐹푗(푥) = 퐹
1/2 with support on [0, 1], the seller values the object at 푥0 = 0. The optimal unique
reserve price is determined by the following equation: (2푁 +푀 +푀/2)푟−푀(푟)1/2−푁 = 0.
When 푁 = 푀 = 1, the optimal reserve price is 0.4846; when 푁 = 2, 푀 = 1, the optimal
reserve price is 0.4910.
Levin and Smith (1996), under the affiliated valuations assumption show that the number
of bidders affects the reserve price. In their paper, the probability of everyone bidding below
푟, and hence, not selling the good may not go to zero in the limit (as 푁 increases) due to
the affiliated values. In our private value settings, the probability of not selling the good is
zero in the limit. Yet, we find the same result.
Now, we will find conditions under which the seller will set an effective reserve price
푟 > 휈, and when he will not. In the theorem below, note that we do not assume regularity
condition in part a; i.e, we do not assume that 퐽푖 functions are increasing.
Theorem 3 Let 푡푖(휈) = 푙푖푚푥↓휈
퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)
Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)
exist.
a) If Σ푁푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈)− 푥0) < 0 then 푟 > 휈.
b) Assume 퐽푖 is increasing for each 푖. If Σ
푁
푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈) − 푥0) ≥ 0 then there will be no
effective reserve price.11
Proof Part a) Suppose 푚 = Σ푁푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈) − 푥0) < 0. Note that by the properties of
the limit function and 퐽 is a continuous function (푓 and 퐹 are continuous and 푓 is positive
everywhere) we have
푚 = Σ푁푖 푡푖(휈)(푙푖푚푥↓휈퐽푖(푥)− 푥0) = Σ푁푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈)− 푥0) < 0
Then, by definition of the limit, for all 휖 > 0, there exists 훿 > 0 such that for all
푥 ∈ (휈, 휈 + 훿), 푚 − 휖 < Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)
Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)
(퐽푖(푥) − 푥0) < 푚 + 휖. Since 푚 < 0, we can pick 휖 small
enough so that Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)(퐽푖(푥)− 푥0) < 0, and thus −Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)(퐽푖(푥)− 푥0) > 0 for
all 푥 ∈ (휈, 휈+훿). But this last expression is the derivative of the revenue function, so a seller
will strictly increase revenues by setting 푟 > 휈.
11We are grateful to an anonymous referee whose suggestions helped us to write this generalized theorem.
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Suppose 푚 = Σ푁푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈) − 푥0) < 0. Then, by definition of the limit, for all 휖 > 0,
there exists 훿 > 0 such that for all 푥 ∈ (휈, 휈+ 훿), 푚− 휖 < Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)(퐽푖(푥)−푥0) < 푚+ 휖.
Since 푚 < 0, we can pick 휖 small enough so that Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)(퐽푖(푥) − 푥0) < 0, and thus
−Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)(퐽푖(푥)−푥0) > 0 for all 푥 ∈ (휈, 휈+훿). But this last expression is the derivative
of the revenue function, so a seller will strictly increase revenues by setting 푟 > 휈.
Part b) Assume that 퐽푖 is increasing for each 푖 and Σ
푁
푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈) − 푥0) > 0 and an
effective reserve price 푟 > 휈 exists. By Lemma 1, this 푟 must satisfy Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)(퐽푖(푟) −
푥0) = 0. But then for all 푥 ∈ (휈, 푟) we have Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푥)푓푖(푥)(퐽푖(푥)−푥0) < 0 by the fact that 퐽푖
are increasing, and퐻(.) and 푓(.) are positive. But then the assumption Σ푁푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈)−푥0) >
0 cannot hold. This is a contradiction; hence, no effective reserve price exists.
Now suppose Σ푁푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈)−푥0) = 0 and an effective reserve price 푟 > 휈 exists. Again, by
Lemma 1, this 푟 must satisfy Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)(퐽푖(푟)−푥0) = 0. But we have Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)(퐽푖(푟)−
푥0) > 0 by the fact that Σ
푁
푖 푡푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈) − 푥0) = 0, 퐽푖 are increasing, and 퐻(.) and 푓(.) are
positive. Again, this is a contradiction; hence, no effective reserve price exists.
Before discussing the implications of the theorem, we give a corollary providing easier
sufficient conditions to check.
Corollary 4 a) If 퐽푖(휈) < 푥0 for each 푖 then 푟 > 휈.
b) Assume that 퐽푖 are increasing and 퐽푖(휈) > 푥0 for each 푖 then 푟 = 휈. That is, effectively,
there is no reserve price.
Proof Part a) If the seller values the object at 푥0, the derivative of the expected revenue
function becomes:
푥0Σ
푁
푖 푓푖(푟)퐻푖(푟) + Σ
푁
푖 퐻푖(푟)(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)푟)
= Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푟)(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) = −[Σ푁푖 퐻푖(푟)푓푖(푟)(퐽푖(푟)− 푥0)] (4)
By the assumption 퐽푖(휈) < 푥0 and continuity of revenue function and the fact that
derivative of the revenue function is zero exactly at 휈, we can find a small 휖 > 0, −Σ푁푖 [(퐽푖(휈+
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휖)− 푥0)푓푖(휈 + 휖)퐻푖(휈 + 휖) > 0 without making any assumption on the curvature of 퐽푖. But
then, by setting the reserve price slightly more than 휈 + 휖 increases revenue. This completes
the proof.
Part b) The first order derivative of expected revenue function,
−[Σ푁푖 퐻푖(휈)푓푖(휈)(퐽푖(휈) − 푥0)], is zero. For any 푟 > 휈 in the support, the first order
derivative is negative since 퐽(.) is increasing and 퐽푖(휈) > 푥0, and 퐻 and 푓 are positive.
Since increasing the reserve price decreases the revenue, the optimal reserve price should be
set at 푟 = 휈.12
Corollary 4 implies that when 푥0 > 휈 (and 푓푖 are positive as the standard assumption),
setting 푟 > 0 (i.e., using an effective reserve price) is always optimal when the support is on
[0, 휈]. Therefore, we generalize this result in the literature (e.g. Krishna (2009)) with our
proposition above.
When will the seller not use the reserve price? 퐽푖(휈) > 푥0 implies that 1 < 푓푖(휈)(휈 − 푥0)
which in turn implies that 휈 > 푥0. Hence, a necessary condition not to use reserve price
is 휈 > 푥0. Also, 푓푖(휈) should be big enough. This means, there has to be an enough mass
of consumers with valuations close to 휈. Note that Myerson’s optimal auction will not use
effective reserve price under these conditions. Our contribution is to explicitly state the
sufficient conditions for not using the effective reserve price.
We believe that there are certain cases in which 푥0 can be negative. For example, there
may be a storage cost of keeping the object to the seller or a firm that is making a loss under
the current management may have negative values to the seller. In these cases, the seller
may not use the reserve price (or equivalently set the reserve price equal to 휈).
Example (No reserve price): Assume two bidders. Their valuation is drawn from
the support [4, 5]. The first one has a uniform density function 푓1 = 1. The second one has
a density function 푓2 = −3.5 + 푥. The seller values the object at 푥0 = 1. Then, the seller
would not set an effective reserve price.
Englebrecht-Wiggans (1987), by assuming that bidders have a cost to participate in the
12The seller may set any reserve price less than or equal to 휈 but this is effectively using no reserve price.
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auction, and Dastidar (2010), by assuming a model with non-quasi linear utility functions,
show that the optimal reserve price will be equal to zero (effectively no reserve price). Also,
McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Lu (2010) show that sellers may not use reserve price but
the “endogenous number” of bidders have to buy information/pay entry fee. Unlike all these
papers, we use asymmetric bidders and find conditions when the seller will use the reserve
price and when it will not use it. If the reserve price is not used (like in the example above),
this implies that the auction is efficient since the object will always be sold. When using a
reserve price is not optimal in a second price auction, we do not have to be concerned with
the assumption of whether the seller can commit not to sell the object in a second auction.13
2.1 Stochastic Dominance with N types and a Reserve Price
We will introduce 푁 types that we will order from “strongest” to “weakest” in the sense
of reverse hazard rate and hazard rate dominance.14 Specifically, we assume that 퐹1/푓1 <
퐹2/푓2 < ... < 퐹푁/푓푁 in the interior of the support.
15 In addition, we assume 푓푖 nondecreasing
which in turn implies that 퐽푖 are increasing. The proof of the proposition shows that the
derivative of the revenue function is single-crossing zero from above –for the interior values–
. This implies that the revenue function is quasi-concave, and hence, the reserve price is
unique.
Proposition 5 Suppose that all 푓푖 are non-decreasing and 퐽푖(휈) < 푥0 for each 푖 (i.e., 푟 >
휈). There are 푁 types of bidders ranked from strongest to weakest in the sense of both
hazard rate dominance, 1−퐹1(푥)
푓1(푥)
> 1−퐹2(푥)
푓2(푥)
> ... > 1−퐹푁 (푥)
푓푁 (푥)
and reverse hazard rate dominance,
퐹1(푥)/푓1(푥) < 퐹2(푥)/푓2(푥) < ... < 퐹푁(푥)/푓푁(푥) for 푥 ∈ (휈, 휈) and 푀푖 bidders for each type.
Then, there is a unique reserve price 푟 that maximizes revenue which can be calculated from
13With the exception of McAfee and Vincent (1997) who assume seller will re-auction the object if it is
not sold, the literature generally assumes that seller will make this “not re-auction” commitment credibly
(e.g. Myerson (1981).
14If one assumes likelihood ratio dominance, it would imply both reverse hazard rate and hazard rate
dominance (Krishna (2009)).
15Note that the way we write the inequalities are such that 퐹푖 dominates 퐹푗 for 푖 < 푗 in terms of the
reverse hazard rate. Also note that 퐹푖(휈) = 0 and hence the whole term will be equal to zero for all 푖 so we
define inequalities only in the interior of the support.
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equation 3.
Proof of Proposition 5: From equation 3 in Lemma 1, the optimal reserve price
satisfies:
Σ푁푖=1푀푖퐻푖(푟)(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) = 0.
First note that likelihood ratio dominance implies hazard rate dominance (i.e. 휆푖(푟) =
(푓푖(푟)/(1 − 퐹푖(푟)) < 휆푗(푟)) and first order stochastic dominance (i.e., 퐹푖(푟) < 퐹푗(푟)) in the
interior of the support. This implies that (1 − 휆푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0))(1 − 퐹푖(푟)) > (1 − 휆푗(푟)(푟 −
푥0))(1−퐹푗(푟))⇔ (1−퐹푖(푟)−푓푖(푟)(푟−푥0)) > (1−퐹푗(푟)−푓푗(푟)(푟−푥0)) for 푖 < 푗. Therefore,
there cannot be a unique 푟 that makes 1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0) = 0 for all 푖.
It is clearly not the case that all terms in the first order condition sum, Σ푁푖=1푀푖퐻푖(푟)(1−
퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)), are positive or negative. So for some 푗 ∈ {2, ..., 푁 − 1}, (1− 퐹푘(푟)−
푓푘(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) > 0 for all 1 ≤ 푘 ≤ 푗 − 1 and 1 − 퐹푘(푟) − 푓푘(푟)(푟 − 푥0) < 0 for 푗 ≤ 푘 ≤ 푁 .
From now on, 푗 will denote that cutoff agent.
Take the derivative of this first order equation and get:
Σ푁푖=1[푀푖ℎ푖(푟)(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) +푀푖퐻푖(푟)(−2푓푖(푟)− 푓 ′푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0))].
Since the density functions are nondecreasing, we have
Σ푁푖=1푀푖퐻푖(푟)(−2푓푖(푟) − 푓 ′푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) < 0, so we will ignore this part of the sum and
focus on showing that (*) Σ푁푖=1[푀푖ℎ푖(푟)(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) < 0.
We solve for 1− 퐹푗(푟)− 푓푗(푟)(푟 − 푥0) from the first order condition and substitute this
into (*) to get:
Σ푁푖∕=푗푀푖ℎ푖(푟)(1 − 퐹푖(푟) − 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0)) +푀푗ℎ푗(푟)(−Σ푁푖=2푀푖퐻푖(푟)(1 − 퐹푖(푟) − 푓푖(푟)(푟 −
푥0))/푀푗퐻푗(푟))
We do not have to be concerned with division by zero since our assumptions ensure that
푟 > 휈 by proposition 4. After cancelling 푀푗 in the right hand term and combining both
terms, we are left with:
Σ푁푖∕=푗푀푖퐻푖(푟)(ℎ푖(푟)/퐻푖(푟)− ℎ푗(푟)/퐻푗(푟))(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0))
By using ℎ푘(푟)/퐻푘(푟) = Σ푙 ∕=푖푓푙(푟)/퐹푙(푟), we can re-write the term above as:
Σ푁푖∕=푗푀푖퐻푖(푟)(푓푗(푟)/퐹푗(푟)− 푓푖(푟)/퐹푖(푟))(1− 퐹푖(푟)− 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0))
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This is less than 0: The first 푗 − 1 terms are less than 0 because for each 푖 such that
1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푗 − 1, we have 푓푗/퐹푗 − 푓푖/퐹푖 < 0 (by reverse hazard rate assumption) and 1 −
퐹푖(푟) − 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0) > 0 (since 푗 is the cutoff agent). The 푗 + 1 to nth terms are less
than 0 because for each 푖 such that 푗 + 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푁 , 푓푗(푟)/퐹푗(푟) − 푓푖(푟)/퐹푖(푟) > 0 and
1 − 퐹푖(푟) − 푓푖(푟)(푟 − 푥0) < 0. Therefore, any 푟 that satisfies the first order condition must
also satisfy the second order condition (concavity). This implies uniqueness of an optimal
reserve price. To see why, suppose there are two distinct values 푟1 and 푟2 that maximize
expected revenue and suppose without loss of generality that 푟1 < 푟2. Both of these points
must satisfy the first order condition and hence the second order condition, as we have just
shown. But by the differentiability (and hence, continuity) of the expected revenue function,
this would imply that there is a point 푟3 ∈ (푟1, 푟2) such that there is a local minimum at 푟3
and the first order condition is therefore satisfied at 푟3.
16 But this is a contradiction because
we have just shown that any point that satisfies the first order condition must be a local
maximum. Therefore, the optimal reserve price is unique.
For example, let 퐹푁 = 푥 be uniform distribution function on [0, 1], 퐹푁−1 = (퐹푁)2 =
푥2,...,퐹1 = (퐹푁)
푁 = 푥푁 . This is the power distribution widely used in asymmetric bidders
literature. (see Cantillon (2008), for example). This example satisfies all conditions of our
proposition 5; hence, the reserve price that satisfies equation 3 is the optimal unique reserve
price. More examples can be created by replacing the uniform distribution in the example
with any other distribution that has a non-decreasing density function.
Next, we will show that under some conditions, replacing a weaker bidder with a stronger
one may lower the optimal reserve price.
Normally, one would expect that if a stronger bidder joins the auction, the seller should
increase the reserve price. Next, we will give an example that this is not correct; that
is, there is not a monotonic relation between first order stochastic dominance and optimal
reserve price. Let us emphasize that in this example, some 푓푖 are decreasing.
16Since 푟1 and 푟2 satisfy the second order condition, the expected revenue function cannot be a line between
푟1 and 푟2.
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Example 6 Suppose there are 푁 bidders whose valuations are drawn from a uniform distri-
bution 퐹 and 푀 bidders whose valuations are drawn from the distribution function 퐹푗(푥) =
퐹훼 with support on [0, 1]. For any 훼 > 0, the optimal unique reserve price is determined by
the following equation: (2푁 +푀 +푀훼)푟−푀(푟)1−훼−푁 = 0. When 0 < 훼 < 1, the second
order condition holds and 푀 bidders are weak bidders in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance, and as 훼 increases, bidders become stronger. Figure 1 shows the optimal reserve
price as 훼 changes. That is, we keep 푁 bidders in the auction but replace 훼 = 0.1 bidders
with 훼 = 0.2 bidders, then replace 훼 = 0.2 bidders with 훼 = 0.3 bidders and so on. Figure 1
shows that the optimal reserve price first decreases, then increases.
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Figure 1: 푁 =푀 = 5. When 0 < 훼 < 1, optimal reserve price may decrease.
To understand why there is no monotonic relation between 훼 and 푟, suppose that 훼 is
extremely low; that is, there is a very high probability that the weak bidder’s valuation is
close to zero. Hence, the seller is better off by selecting a reserve price similar to what they
would choose if they faced only the strong bidder. As a result, they will either sell the object
to the strong bidder at the reserve price or will not sell the object at all. Now, if we increase
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훼 slightly, the weak bidder may bid above the reserve price at a time when the strong bidder
turns out to have a low valuation that is below 푟. Lowering 푟 makes sense since the seller is
more likely to sell the good to one of the types. The marginal benefit of lowering 푟 is selling
to the weak type at the new 푟. The marginal cost is selling the good to the strong type at
the new low reserve price. The first effect must be dominating at low 훼 so that the seller
decreases the reserve price. As the weak type becomes stronger (we increase 훼 further), then
the risk of not selling the object diminishes considerably; hence, there is no need to decrease
the reserve price, rather it is better to increase it.
Hu et. al (2010) shows that the more risk averse the seller is the lower the reserve price
(since a more risk averse seller does not want to face the risk of not selling the object). In
our paper, we show that the optimal reserve price will be lower when the seller is risk-neutral
but the type of bidders change.
3 Conclusion
We characterized the optimal reserve price for asymmetric bidders. First, we showed that, in
contrast to the symmetric case, the number of bidders changes the reserve price. When the
bidders’ types are known, the seller should set a different reserve price for each bidder where
the virtual valuations of each bidder is equal to seller’s valuation at the optimal reserve price.
This may create an inefficient allocation (Myerson (1981)) in the sense a bidder that values
the object less may win the auction.17 In our model, we show that the unique reserve price
is found by setting a weighted average of bidders’ virtual valuations equal to the seller’s
valuation of the object. Hence, the allocation is more efficient; the bidder who values the
object most will win the auction as long as his valuation is above the reserve price. Second,
we gave sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal reserve price. Third, with an
example, we showed that if a weak bidder is replaced with a strong bidder in an auction,
the optimal reserve price may decrease. Hence, there is no monotonic relation between first
17We once again acknowledge that the inefficiency in Myerson’s paper can be due to the allocation rule;
one with the highest virtual valuation gets the object. The mechanism favors the weak.
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order stochastic dominance and the reserve price. Finally, we showed when the seller will use
a reserve price in an asymmetric auction and when she will not. The conditions that make
the seller abstain from using a reserve price are sufficient to make the auction an efficient
one, since the object will always be sold to the bidder who values it most.
One potential avenue for future research is finding the optimal reserve price for the first-
price auction under these asymmetric bidders assumption. Unfortunately, this is complicated
since it is well-known that finding equilibrium explicitly is valid only for limited cases even
without reserve price. In addition, Maskin and Riley (2000) and Cantillon (2008) find their
results for first price auctions with only two bidders.
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